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This article discusses the current progress and solutions to the symbol grounding 
problem, indentify specifically which aspects of the problem have been already 
addressed, and which other issues and scientific challenges still require 
investigation. In particular, the paper suggests that of the various aspects of the 
symbol grounding problems, the one that still require significant research is that on 
the transition from indexical representations to symbol-symbol relationships. This 
analysis initiated a debate and solicited commentaries from experts in the field, to 
gather consensus on actual progress and achievements and to identify the 
challenges still open in the symbol grounding problem. 
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The grounding of symbols, i.e. the process by which symbols (such as words) are 
linked to the agent’s own semantic representation of the world, is an issue of crucial 
importance to the field of cognitive science, raging from philosophy and semiotics, to 
artificial intelligence, and to cognitive robotics. For example, in cognitive and 
developmental robotics, in the last decades there has been a tremendous increase 
in new models of the evolution of communication and the developmental acquisition 
of language. These models directly regard the issue of symbol grounding, since 
robotic agents are trained to use symbols that often refer to entities and states in the 
robot’s own world.  
 
In the literature on artificial intelligence, cognitive science and philosophy, there has 
been extensive discussion on the symbol grounding problem. Different views on the 
importance of the symbol grounding have been proposed. On one extreme, we find 
the so called “symbolic” approaches that practically ignore the cognitive significance 
of such an issue (e.g. Fodor 1983, Chomsky 1965). This is the case of classical 
GOFAI (Good Old Fashion Artificial Intelligence) approaches, based on symbolic 
methods such as logic, where the meaning or a linguistic symbol (word) is simply 
represented by another symbol (meaning), without having to deal of how meanings 
have formed and have been associated to words. On the other hand, new 
“embodied” approaches to cognition acknowledge the importance of grounding 
symbols through the agent’s interaction with the environment. However, even in this 
field, there have been suggestions that the problem has practically been solved 
(Steels 2008), thus appearing to suggest that the symbol grounding problem is not 
important anymore.  
 
In this target article, I am going to suggest a different analysis of the current progress 
on symbol grounding, indentify specifically which aspects of the problem have been 
already addressed, and which other issues still require investigation. This analysis 
will initiate a debate and solicit commentaries from experts in the field, to gather 
consensus on actual progress, achievements and open challenges in the symbol 
grounding problem. 
 
To assess better the current state of the art on the Symbol Ground Problem, I will 
use the definition and discussion of the problem originally given by Stevan Harnad in 
his seminal 1990 article “The Symbol Grounding Problem”. Here Harnad explains 
that the symbol grounding problem refers to the capability of natural and artificial 
cognitive agents to acquire an intrinsic link (autonomous, we would say in nowadays 
robotics terminology) between internal symbolic representations and some referents 
in the external word or internal states. In addition, Harnad explicitly proposes a 
definition of a symbol that requires the existence of logical links (e.g. syntactic) 
between the symbols themselves. It is thanks to these inter-symbol links, its 
associated symbol manipulation processes, and the symbol grounding transfer 
mechanism (Cangelosi & Riga 2006) that a symbolic system like human language 
can exist. The symbol-symbol link is the main property that differentiates a real 
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symbol from an index, as in Peirce’s semiotics. These symbolic (e.g. syntactic) links 
also support the phenomena of productivity and generativity in language, and 
contribute to the grounding of abstract concepts and symbols (Barsalou 1999). 
Finally, an important component of the symbol grounding problem is the social and 
cultural dimension, that is the role of social interaction in the sharing of symbols 
(a.k.a. the external/social symbol grounding problem, as in Cangelosi 2006; Vogt 
1997; Vogt & Divina, 2007).  
 
To summarise, we can say that there are three sub-problems in the development of 
a grounded symbol system:  
(i) how can a cognitive agent autonomously link symbols to referents in the world 
such as objects, events and internal and external states;  
(ii) how can an agent autonomously create a set of symbol-symbol relationships 
and the associated transition from an indexical system to a proper symbol 
system;  
(iii)  how can a society of agents autonomously develop a shared set of symbols.  
 
When we look at the current cognitive agent models of language learning (e.g. 
Cangelosi & Parisi, 2002; Wagner et al. 2003; Lyon et al. 2007), I believe that much 
progress has been achieved in the first and third sub-problems (individual and social 
grounding of symbols), whilst I believe that for the second sub-problem (autonomous 
creating of symbol-symbol relationships) much still needs to be done. I therefore 
agree with Steels (2008) that much has been done on the robotic and cognitive 
modelling of the symbol grounding problem, but only when we consider the two sub-
problems (i) and (iii), “we now understand enough to create experiments in which 
groups of agents self-organize symbolic systems that are grounded in their 
interactions with the world and others” (Steels 2008: page 240). 
 
For example, when we consider the well known “Talking Heads” model of the 
emergence of communication in robotic agents (Steels, 1999; Kaplan & Steels, 
2002), we have a demonstration that each individual robot can autonomously create 
categorical representations of the world (a white board with a variable combination of 
coloured shapes). Using the technique of discrimination trees, each agent creates 
categories defined by specific patters of boundaries of color, shape and spatial 
values. In addition, these perceptual categories become associated with words that 
the agents use to communicate with each other in “language games” (Steels 2001). 
That is, these categories constitute the internal meanings of the agent’s 
communication lexicon. What is crucial in this model is that the association of a 
specific perceptual category with a word is mediated by the social interaction with the 
other agents. This therefore leads to the cultural evolution of a shared set of words 
(symbols). Such a modelling approach has been extended to human-robot 
communication systems, such as for the training of the AIBO pet dog to name 
objects (Kaplan & Steels, 2000). 
 
In a multi-agent model of the evolutionary emergence of communication, similar 
mechanisms for the grounding of shared lexicons have been utilised (Cangelosi 
2001). Simulated cognitive agents live in a 2D world to perform foraging tasks and 
learn to differentiate between edible mushrooms (that when eaten increase the 
chances of survival and reproduction) and toadstools (which cause a decrease of 
fitness). Agents autonomously learn to categorize foods in edible and inedible 
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categories through their own neural network that controls the agent’s perceptual and 
motor system. In addition, as agents are allowed to communicate with each-other, 
this cause the gradual evolution of a shared lexicon. The activation patterns in the 
agents’ neural network (hidden units) constitute the distributed semantic 
representations of the food categories, and at the same time they support the 
linguistic comprehension and production capability of the agents. In fact, analyses of 
the agent’s internal representations suggest that the evolutionary pressure to evolve 
a shared lexicon is explained by the categorical perception effects of these 
representations.  
 
The above examples are only some of the numerous cognitive agents and robotics 
models of the evolution and acquisition of language that have demonstrated the 
mechanisms for the autonomous grounding of symbols and the emergence of 
shared lexicons (e.g. Loula et al. 2010; Marocco et al. in press; Roy 2005; Vogt 
2005; Vogt & Divina 2007). At the same time, as Steels also acknowledges, it is also 
true that we do not yet have a full understanding of all the mechanisms in grounding, 
such as on the nature, role and making of internal symbolic representations.  
 
As for the sub-problem (ii), i.e. the transition from a communication systems based 
on indices (e.g. labels, animal communication, early child language learning) to that 
of a full symbolic system (e.g. adult human languages), I believe that the problem 
has not really been solved at all, and much needs to be done.  
 
Most computational models of syntactic learning and evolution, based on the 
grounding principles as defined above, have only loosely addressed the issue of the 
autonomous development of symbol-symbol relationships. In very few cases, 
grounded models of the evolution of communication use limited syntactic constructs 
that partially resemble grammatical constructs (e.g. Cangelosi 2001; Cangelosi et al. 
2000). In other cases, robotics models of the evolution of language use pre-defined, 
symbolic approaches to represent symbol-symbol relationships, e.g. by assuming 
the pre-existence of semantic and syntactic categories in the agent’s cognitive 
system. This is however in contrast with the grounding principles, as the aim of a 
cognitive agent model of the evolution of language is to discover the evolutionary, 
neural and cognitive mechanisms that lead to the emergence of syntactic symbol-
symbol representations.  
 
I invite my colleagues to comment on the state of the art on the symbol grounding 
problem in cognitive science and robotic models of communication and language, 
and on their view on the importance (or not!) of the symbol grounding problem. I 
suggest below some open challenges for future research that I believe are crucial for 
our understanding of the symbol grounding phenomena, and I welcome suggestions 
for other important, unsolved challenges in this field. 
(1) Is the symbol grounding problem, and the three sub-problems as identified 
above, still a real crucial issue in cognitive robotics research? And if the 
problem appears to have been solved, as some have suggested, why is it that 
so far we have failed at building robots that can learn language like children 
do? 
(2) What are the processes that lead to the transition from indexical 
communication system to a full symbolic system such as language? Is there a 
continuum between indices (labels) and symbols (words), or is the transition 
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qualitative and sudden? What known phenomena in language origins 
theories, and in developmental studies, should be included in developmental 
and evolutionary robotics model of language?  
(3) Notwithstanding the importance of the grounding problem, there are still 
various approaches in the agent/robot language learning/evolution literature 
that practically ignore the process of grounding and use a symbolic-only 
approach to the definition of meanings and words. Do these symbolic 
approaches really give an important contribution to our understading of 
human cognition, of should all models of language learning be based solely 
on grounding mechanisms?  
(4) Does cognitive development really plays an important role in symbol 
grounding and acquisition, or is it just an epiphenomenon of no crucial 
importance to the understanding of human cognition? Some key findings and 
experiments show that infants have strong specific biases that allow them to 
learn very easily language. And most attempts at building robots without these 
biases have failed so far to learn realistically complex concepts/semantic 
categories. Is the symbol grounding problem just a matter of using and 
identifying such biases in robotics language models? 
(5) What kind of robotic experiment would constitute a real breakthrough to 
advance the debate on symbol grounding, and what kind of principle and 
ideas are still unexplored? 
(6) What are the properties and differences of internal representations beyond 
both indexical and symbolic systems? Or are representation issues not really 
crucial, as a pure sensorimotor modelling approach would not require any 
internal representation capability? 
(7) How can we model the grounding of abstract concepts such as beauty, 
happiness, time. Or is the grounding approach inconsistent with the study of 
higher-order symbolic capabilities? 
(8) What are the grounding components in the acquisition and use of function 
words (such as verb preposition “to”, as in verbs “to go”, “if”, “the”), of number  
concepts/words, and of morphology and other syntactic properties.  
(9) How can we model the grounding phenomena studies through empirical 
investigations of language embodiment (Barsalou 1999; Glenberg & Kaschak 
2002; Pecher & Zwaan 2005)? 
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